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PRECAP; State of Montana v. James Morris Colburn: When the Sole 
Defense is Precluded by Montana’s Rape Shield Law 
Caitlin S. Williams  
No. DA 14-0181 Montana Supreme Court 
 
Oral Argument: Wednesday, December 2, 2015 at 9:30 AM in the 
Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice 
Building, Helena, Montana. 
 
I.  QUESTION PRESENTED 
 Did application of Montana’s rape shield law, excluding 
evidence of the victim’s motive to fabricate and source of sexual 
knowledge, violate the Defendant’s constitutional right to present a 
complete defense? 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 Appellant James Morris Colburn was charged with two counts of 
incest of his daughter, “C.C.”, age eleven, and sexual intercourse without 
consent and two counts of sexual assault of his neighbor “R.W.”, age 
eleven.1 Colburn was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to 
Montana State Prison for 100 years.2 Although Colburn initially appealed 
each of these charges, the issue on appeal was ultimately narrowed to the 
charges regarding the sexual abuse of R.W.3 
During a forensic interview, R.W. described two separate 
incidents in which Colburn molested her in various ways.4 R.W. was 
interviewed about these incidents by Nurse Mary Pat Hanson at the First 
STEP Resource Center at St. Patrick’s Hospital.5 Based on the interview, 
Hanson concluded that R.W. possessed sexual knowledge consistent with 
that of a child who experienced sexual abuse.6 The video of Hanson’s 
interview with R.W. was played for the jury at trial.7 
Prior to trial, Colburn filed a motion in limine seeking to 
introduce evidence of an alternative source for R.W.’s sexual knowledge, 
                                           
1 Appellee’s Response Br. at 1, State of Montana v. James Morris Colburn, (Mont. June 15, 
2015)(DA 14-0181). 
2 Id. at 5. 
3 Appellee’s Supplemental Reply Br. at 1, State of Montana v. James Morris Colburn, (Mont. Oct. 9, 
2015)(DA 14-0181). 
4 Appellee’s Response Br. at 3. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 4. 
7 Id. 
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specifically alleged sexual abuse by her biological father.8 However, the 
introduction of evidence of prior sexual abuse is inadmissible under 
Montana’s “rape shield” statute.9 The district court reserved ruling on the 
motion until trial, where it was ultimately deemed inadmissible.10 




A. Whether the application of the rape shield violated Appellant’s 
constitutional right to a defense? 
 
Montana’s rape shield statute states: 
  
Evidence concerning the sexual conduct of the victim is 
inadmissible in prosecutions . . . except evidence of the 
victim’s past sexual conduct with the offender or 
evidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual 
activity to show the origin of semen, pregnancy, or 
disease that is at issue in the prosecution.12 
 
Colburn argues the application of the rape shield deprived him of 
his constitutional right to present a defense13 “as guaranteed by the Fifth, 
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution.”14 He proposes that 
the Court employ a case-specific balancing test to weigh “the interests 
expressed in the statute against the force of the defendant’s 
constitutionally-protected right to a defense . . . to determine whether the 
particular exclusion of evidence under the rule was unconstitutional.”15 
More specifically, Colburn argues that the exclusion of evidence of a 
possible alternative source of R.W.’s sexual knowledge and the 
exclusion of evidence of R.W.’s alleged motive to fabricate her 
allegations against him prevented him from presenting a complete 
defense.16  
The State argues the district court did not err in applying the rape 
shield to this case, as “Montana’s Rape Shield Law was designed to 
                                           
8 Br. of Appellant at 2, State of Montana v. James Morris Colburn, (Mont. Dec. 9, 2014)(DA 14-
0181). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 10–11. 
11 Appellant’s Supplemental Reply Br. at 2, State of Montana v. James Morris Colburn, (Mont. Oct. 
23, 2015)(DA 14-0181). 
12 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–5–511(2). 
13 Appellant’s Supplemental Reply Br. at 7. 
14 Br. of Appellant at 11. 
15 Appellant’s Supplemental Reply Br. at 2. 
16 Id. 
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protect the privacy and dignity of the victims of sexual crimes.”17 
Further, the State argues the two exceptions present in the statute, (1) 
allowing evidence of past sexual conduct between the victim and the 
offender, and (2) allowing evidence of the origin of semen, pregnancy, or 
disease, are not applicable in this case.18 As to the first exception, 
Colburn’s defense does not stem from prior sexual activity between 
himself and R.W., but rather is directed at R.W.’s prior sexual activity 
with another offender.19 Regarding the second exception, pregnancy and 
disease are not at issue and Colburn did not present any proof of R.W.’s 
sexual activity, which is the requirement for showing the origin of 
semen.20 Based on these conclusions, the State argues the application of 
the rape shield is appropriate, and notes that, where the exceptions are 
not met, the Montana Supreme Court “has repeatedly rejected arguments 
that application of the rape shield law violates a defendant’s 
constitutional rights to confrontation or to present a defense.”21  
Specifically, Colburn raises two separate theories he was unable 
to present at trial due to the application of the rape shield law. 
 
1. Motive to Fabricate 
 Colburn argues the preclusion of evidence pointing towards the 
victim’s motive to fabricate evidence of sexual assault violated his right 
to present a complete defense.22 He asserts that R.W. used her allegedly 
false allegations against him to “test the waters” with her mother and 
gauge her reaction to those allegations before revealing the allegedly true 
incident of sexual abuse imposed by her biological father.23 Colburn 
argues that after her mother believed her allegations toward Colburn, 
R.W. felt “safe” enough to disclose the “higher-stakes” abuse by her 
father.24 However, since Colburn was not allowed to introduce the 
alleged sexual assault of R.W. by her father, he argues the jury was 
unable to consider R.W.’s motive to fabricate the allegations against 
him.25 Colburn states “the Constitution protects a defendant’s right to 
introduce and argue a motive to fabricate . . . without a court having to 
find the jury necessarily would have believed the theory.”26 
 
                                           
17 Appellee’s Response Br. at 19. 
18 Id. at 20. 
19 Id. at 20–21. 
20 Id. at 21. 
21 Appellee’s Supplemental Br. at 4. 
22 Appellant’s Supplemental Reply Br. at 7. 
23 Id. at 14–15. 
24 Id.  
25 Id.  at 16–17. 
26 Id.  
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Conversely, the State argues that Colburn’s theory of R.W.’s 
motive to fabricate was unsubstantiated absent expert testimony.27 
Similarly, the State contends Colburn’s attempt to use Nurse Hanson’s 
testimony that “children can sometimes lie” to prove that R.W. had 
motive to fabricate her allegations was also unfounded, as the “testimony 
by Hanson left Colburn’s fabrication theory merely a theory, an 
unsubstantiated guess, an argument at best that rests only upon a 
platitude, no expert was required to assert, that children can sometimes 
lie.”28 
 
2. Source of Knowledge 
 
Additionally, Colburn argues the exclusion of evidence pointing 
to an alternative source of R.W.’s sexual knowledge violated his right to 
present a complete defense,29 as “the State at trial chose to use R.W.’s 
sexual knowledge to bolster her credibility and prove its case, then used 
the rape shield to exclude relevant rebuttal evidence.”30 Further, Colburn 
asserts that since jurors would “naturally infer” that R.W. must have 
been sexually abused to have such “graphic sexual knowledge,” he 
should “be permitted to rebut the inference” that the victim was sexually 
abused and could not have fabricated the allegations.31 As Colburn 
initially sought to introduce R.W.’s statements to Nurse Hanson 
regarding sexual abuse by her father,32 Colburn now argues this evidence 
was necessary to presenting a complete defense, as “[t]he evidence of 
abuse by R.W.’s father was relevant to rebut the powerful inference of 
Colburn’s guilt from R.W.’s sexual abuse knowledge and Nurse 
Hanson’s assessment of R.W.’s credibility based on R.W.’s sexual abuse 
knowledge.”33 
In response, the State cites a prior case, State of Montana v. Van 
Pelt,34 arguing the Court had previously rejected the very argument 
Colburn now asserts:  
 
Appellant cannot argue . . . that he does not seek to 
attack [the victim’s] credibility but rather seeks to 
demonstrate that [the victim] could have gained her 
knowledge of sex outside of her contact with the 
defendant . . . Whether under the guise of showing the 
jury how [the victim] may have obtained her knowledge 
                                           
27 Appellee’s Supplemental Br. at 9–10. 
28 Id. at 10. 
29 Appellant’s Supplemental Reply Br. at 7. 
30 Id. at 7–8. 
31 Id. at 8–9. 
32 Id. at 11–12. 
33 Id. at 13. 
34 805 P.2d 549 (Mont. 1991).  
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of sex, or not, the fact is appellant wished to convince 
the jury that [the victim] fabricated charges against 
him.35 
 
The State further argues evidence of R.W.’s alleged abuse by her 
father lacked relevance and is therefore inadmissible pursuant to Rule 
401 of the Montana Rules of Evidence.36 Similarly, the evidence is 
insufficient under Rule 403 because “the details related to the proposed 
evidence were so sketchy that the district court could easily have 
concluded that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed the 
purported probative value.”37 
Notably, the State did concede that “some of Colburn’s 
criticisms are justified, as the State did overlook the fact that Colburn 
asserted matters shown in other court records of the father’s alleged 
sexual abuse of R.W.”38 However, the State then takes the opportunity to 
further its own argument by identifying “that Colburn never tied the 
father’s sexual abuse of R.W. to drawing and depictions R.W. reported 
was Colburn’s rape of her.”39 Additionally, “Colburn had the ability to 
develop . . . more specific information regarding the father’s prior sexual 




A. Applicability of the Rape Shield 
 The Court is likely to first address the overarching issue of 
whether or not the rape shield is applicable in this case. Although the 
State acknowledged that this Court has regularly upheld application of 
the rape shield as constitutional,41 the fact that the law precludes 
Colburn’s sole defense suggests the Court may question the State on this 
matter. Setting aside the horrific nature of the allegations against him, 
one cannot quickly dismiss the fact that Colburn was essentially 
prevented from presenting a defense. Given Colburn’s constitutional 
right to present a complete defense, the State must show a clear and 
compelling reason behind its argument if it is to prevail.  
The two defense theories Colburn was prevented from asserting 
will be included within the discussion of whether it was appropriate to 
apply the rape shield in this case: (1) R.W.’s alleged motive to fabricate 
                                           
35 Appellee’s Supplemental Br. at 11–12 (citing Van Pelt, 805 P.2d at 552). 
36 Id. at 16–17; see also Mont. R. Evid. 401. 
37 Id. at 17; see also Mont. R. Evid. 403. 
38 Appellee’s Supplemental Br. at 16. 
39 Id.  
40 Id.  
41 Id. at 4. 
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the allegations against him, and (2) R.W.’s alleged alternative source of 
sexual knowledge. 
 
1. Motive to Fabricate 
 
The issue of whether the jury should have been able to hear 
Colburn’s theory that R.W. had reason to fabricate the allegations against 
him will likely be the main subject of debate between the parties. The 
State admitted that it failed to sufficiently address that Colburn raised 
some degree of evidence that R.W. had been sexually abused by her 
father.42 This admission gives Colburn some momentum in his argument 
that R.W. had reason to fabricate her allegations against him as a means 
of “testing the waters” with her mother before disclosing the “higher 
stakes” allegations against her father. However, the State still has a 
strong case that the evidence of R.W.’s alleged sexual abuse by her 
father is inadmissible under the rape shield for public policy reasons. 
There is a significant interest in protecting victims from scrutiny 
surrounding their character, and the State argues for heightened 
protections for victims who are minors.43 The Court will likely address 
the legitimate public policy concerns that would arise if victims were 
subject to greater attack on cross-examination, particularly considering 
the sensitive nature of the allegations and the inherent hesitancy to come 
forward with allegations in the first place. 
 
2. Source of Knowledge 
 
The Court will likely dismiss this argument fairly quickly. The 
fact that Colburn relies primarily on out-of-state cases44 while the State 
presents Montana case law discussing the exact issue in question45 
suggests that the Court will quickly affirm its own previous ruling. 
Public policy concerns are again at issue here, in that if the Court were to 
rule that a potential alternative source of R.W.’s sexual knowledge was 
admissible, it would open the door to a myriad of defendants asserting 
that their accuser obtained his or her sexual knowledge from an 
alternative source. Given the fact that Montana’s rape shield statute is 
designed to protect victims from having their sexual histories examined 





                                           
42 Id.  
43 Appellee’s Response Br. at 19. 
44 Appellee’s Supplemental Br. at 20. 
45 Id. at 11–12. 
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V. PREDICTION  
The Montana Supreme Court will likely agree that the 
application of the rape shield did not violate Colburn’s constitutional 
right to a defense, and even if it did, the State’s legitimate interest in 
protecting victims of sexual assault outweighs Colburn’s interests. 
 
 
